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The French general staff were equally prompt in the formulation of their demands. Following up on his earlier concerns, Joffre had Gamelin and Andre Tardieu, deputy and head of the Second Bureau's Section d'Information, undertake a study in early I 9 I 5 on a possible line of defence for the post-war era. Their conclusions were 'qu 'a defaut du Rhin sur tout son cours', a secondary line of frontier defences could be built along the valleys of the Lauter, the Blies, the Saar, the Sauer, and the Our, ending at Liege.17 The plan assumed not only the return of Alsace-Lorraine, but annexation of that portion of the Saarland south of the Saar river (including Saarlouis) and the inclusion of Luxemburg and Belgium in the French defensive system. Joffre, however, was not satisfied with this preliminary study as a final solution. In the spring of I9I5 the French commander-in-chief was particularly optimistic about the prospects of a breakthrough in the Artois offensive, and an early conclusion of the war.18 Unprepared even to go to the telephone alone 13 The French staff was somewhat ambivalent with regard to the future settlement with Austria-Hungary. While dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into successor states based on nationality was deemed contrary to French interest, it was considered inevitable. The French Staff thus envisioned four successor states, Austria, Hungary, and two other states, drawn largely along the lines of nationality and roughly equivalent to the Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia which later emerged. The prospect of an Austrian state of 6-5 million Germans, which would probably be drawn into the German orbit, was considered undesirable, but a question to be dealt with in future generations.57
The Russia's western frontier in Poland, were thus a fundamental expression of the French government's war aims in Europe. 63 No echo was heard of the French staff's plan for the dismemberment of the German Empire. Joffre's memorandum, ready only on 6 October, was probably too late to form the basis for deliberations on 7 October, and in any case the demands which it formulated were so far right on the political spectrum that it could have commanded only limited support from the moderate government of Aristide Briand.
The more moderate demands of the general staff, however, were inextricably linked with those, of the interests of many other groups, the political centre and right, the iron and steel industry and various patriotic groups, all of whom had close connexions in the government. What seems to emerge, in fact, is a model not dissimilar to that suggested by Andrew and Kanya-Forstner regarding colonial matters, in which a series of close-knit and interlocking groups, many of whose members held important positions in government, were in a position to formulate policy. The existence of a united opposition in the form of a parliamentary left to the traditional power elites and their conservative approach on matters of French security was a basic element in the equation which gave policy makers great pause in the enunciation of policy, especially as the support of the left was necessary for the conduct of the war.
The further impact of the French general staff on the diplomacy of war aims and peace plans is beyond the scope of this essay and is better treated elsewhere.64 Suffice it to say that inJuly I9I7, even under pressure from the socialist left and the Anglo-Americans for a less aggressive stance, one of the memoranda read to the cabinet before a meeting intended to discuss war aims with the British was one prepared by Foch, now chief of the newly constituted general staff. 65 His role in the formulation of official war aims policy under Clemenceau as embodied in the Armistice and later in the peace negotiations is well known.66 The problem was not that the French did not know their own minds, but that the diplomatic framework would not allow the realization of their goals.
